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1. Introduction 
Knowledge of the relationship between school resources and student achievement is crucial for policy 
design. However, despite decades of research, the literature in this area is still inconclusive.1 In part, 
this is due to the difficulty of estimating the relationship between inputs and outputs due to the non-
random allocation of resources.  If parents who care more about education ensure that their children 
attend a “high resource” school, it may in fact be the parents who are causing the better performance 
and not the school itself.  In a similar vein, if school districts allocate money based in order to 
compensate (or reinforce) differences in child abilities, simple OLS estimates of the relationship 
between money and performance will be biased. 
 Identification of the effects of school resources faces several obstacles. First, resources 
are typically endogenously allocated in response to pupil heterogeneity. Educational efficiency is 
characterized by an allocation with larger classes and lower teacher–pupil ratios when pupils are well 
behaved (Lazear, 2001). Moreover, when school authorities care about equality in outcomes, resources 
are partly allocated to schools on the basis of needs. Consequently, efficiency considerations and 
preferences for equality of outcomes may contribute to a negative association between pupil ability 
and school resources.2 Second, school resources are multidimensional, and the “all other inputs equal” 
effect can be hard to identify. For example, the familiar cap on class size, like the Maimonides’ rule, 
generates an exogenous variation in group size (Angrist and Lavy, 1999). However, teacher hour 
intensity per class is subject to choice, and school districts are likely to allocate more teacher hours or 
other resources to pupils who, for exogenous reasons, end up in large classes. Finally, mobile families 
may respond to school resource heterogeneity or sort themselves into school districts or municipalities 
for other reasons, such as the quality of housing (Hoxby, 2000). 
 This study aims to identify the effects of school inputs on pupil achievement at age 16 in 
Norway achievement using a rich dataset from Norway including residential histories of parents. Our 
approach exploits the location of a natural resource –waterfalls – and a set of institutional features for 
taxing this resource that generate exogenous expenditure variation across school districts. Teaching of 
children up to age 16 is provided at the municipality level in Norway. School spending is limited by 
budget constraints faced by local communities, and resource effects can in principle be identified by 
utilizing variation in the level of revenues, or priorities, across municipalities. Richer local 
communities spend more on schools, but local budgets are not orthogonal to the pupil composition. 
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 Leading scholars interpret the evidence differently; see Krueger (2003), Hanushek (2003) and Todd and Wolpin (2003). 
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 Woessmann and West  (2006) find strong evidence of compensatory resource allocation across schools and within schools 
based on students’ ability using international data. 
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Typically, children in high-income families tend to live in municipalities with high levels of tax 
revenues. To satisfy appropriate exclusion restrictions, we need a municipality-level revenue 
component that is “exogenous”. Natural resources often provide economic resources that are unevenly 
distributed across regions. In Norway, hydropower plants provide a tax base for a group of 
municipalities, as nature (closeness to the waterfalls) and technology (introduced about 100 years ago) 
determine plant location and access to this immobile tax source. Nature determined the direction of the 
waterfall, technology determined the location of power plants and the parliament has given local 
municipalities discretion to impose a property tax. Unlike taxes on income, the property tax is not 
taken into account when redistribution among municipalities, including transfers from the central 
government, is determined. About 40% of the municipalities receive revenues from property tax on 
hydropower plants, and we show that most of them spend significantly more on education than other 
comparable municipalities. The effect of school resources is identified by means of instrumental 
variable techniques focusing on the extra spending, or alternatively, teacher hours, provided by the 
hydropower communities. We motivate the IV procedure by reporting non-parametric (Wald) 
estimates from matching on a large set of municipality-level variables relevant for school 
expenditures. 
 Because a single expenditure component such as class size is subject to input substitution 
bias, we focus on overall measures like teacher hours or total expenditures, both relative to the number 
of pupils. Variation in a single component such as class size, keeping all other factors equal, is rarely 
observed. Thus, identification by means of Maimonides’ rule does not account for endogeneity of 
other inputs. When more input characteristics are available in the data, there is also a potential pitfall 
associated with “over-controlling” (Todd and Wolpin, 2003). 
 We use matched register data for a complete cohort of graduates from the final year of 
compulsory schooling (10th grade, age 16), including information on schools and pupils’ performance 
at a centrally marked exam. Conditioning on a rich set of family background variables, we are able to 
control for differences in pupil composition across municipalities. Because our instrument is given at 
the municipality level, we measure performance at the municipality level by means of estimated 
municipality fixed effects from an individual level regression, conditional on pupil and family 
characteristics. Given local government revenues, the level of school resources is influenced by the 
preferences of the electorate in the municipality and the local cost structure for operating schools, and 
we control for this variation by conditioning on a number of variables reflecting relevant municipality 
characteristics 
 The municipalities with hydropower tax revenues are typically small communities with 
scattered populations and longer travelling distances, and thereby not representative of the broader 
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population in terms of community characteristics. In order to limit potential bias because of selectivity 
of municipalities, we focus on “comparable municipalities”, defined as the subset that has a similar 
cost structure when it comes to running schools.  
 Our main findings are as follows. Standard least squares estimates indicate that school 
resources do not affect exam scores. When using hydropower tax revenues as an instrumental variable, 
school resources are found to have a significantly positive impact on pupil performance. The IV 
results indicate that NOK 10,000 (US$1,175) higher expenditures per pupil are estimated to raise the 
exam mark by 0.181. Thus, every sixth pupil will have his/her exam mark raised by one level, on a 
scale from one to six, if the municipality spends NOK 10,000 more on each of them in school. 
Furthermore, this positive resource effect seems to be mainly driven by the outcomes in municipalities 
with high levels of hydropower tax revenues and school expenditures.  
 We also test for alternative explanations of our findings. These robustness checks include 
testing for whether children are inherently different in these municipalities, selective mobility in and 
out of hydro power municipalities, and lastly whether other amenities, such as better day care 
facilities, in hydro power municipalities may explain better performance at the age of 16.  We find no 
indication of superior initial endowments among kids born in these municipalities. Endogenous 
mobility is not driving our results: Estimates based on the majority of pupils born in the municipality 
of graduation do not differ from those which include pupils moved in after birth and results do not 
change when we allocate pupils to their municipality of birth rather than their municipality of 
graduation. Finally, the observed differences in the level of day care services (as an example of 
correlated amenities) are unlikely to explain performance differentials more than ten years later 
2. Identification strategies and empirical specification 
Using non-experimental or observational data to identify causal effects of school resources on student 
performance is challenging because school authorities, teachers and parents all make choices (Todd 
and Wolpin, 2003). School authorities not only fix total spending but also decide on the mix of input 
factors. If a single component is restricted, say class size, input substitution is likely to take place, for 
equity or efficiency reasons. Large classes are given more teacher hours, or extra resources of another 
kind. In addition, resources are usually allocated endogenously in response to pupil heterogeneity. 
Residential choice represents another challenge. Pupils are not randomly distributed across schools 
because families sort themselves into municipalities and school districts as a consequence of choosing 
a neighbourhood to live in. Finally, teachers may adjust their efforts in response to changes in school 
resource inputs. Consequently standard regression based evidence will only provide limited insight 
into the effect(s) of school resources on performance. The influence of sorting and input substitution 
6 
on the correlation between the error term in the performance equation (unobserved ability and 
unobserved school inputs) and school resources is likely to differ across countries depending on the 
institutions that allocate resources to schools, and the pattern of parental school choice. While family 
sorting in the United States is likely to establish a positive association because families with stronger 
preference for education cluster in school districts with more resources, compensating resource 
allocations are presumably more important in (many European) countries with a more centralized 
public funding of schools. All in all, the presence of input substitution and compensating resource 
allocation imply that standard correlations between observed school inputs and pupil outcomes may 
not reflect causal relationships, even if they are conditional on a large set of relevant controls. 
 Several identification strategies are used in the literature. The experimental approach 
requires specifically designed data. Krueger (1999) and Krueger and Whitmore (2001) build on 
randomized allocation of resources to pupils—the Tennessee Student/Teacher Achievement Ratio 
(STAR) experiment conducted in the 1980s—to test the effect of class size on test scores. Their 
evidence supports the view that smaller classes improve test scores. The natural experiment or quasi-
experimental tradition uses regular observational data, focussing on institutional features that provide 
exogenous assignment of different school environments to pupils. The influential study by Angrist and 
Lavy (1999) exploits the so-called Maimonides’ rule, fixing the maximum class size in Israeli schools, 
so that class size is directly related to the number of pupils in a given grade. Their findings support the 
view that smaller classes raise test scores. A growing number of studies have followed in the 
Angrist/Lavy tradition using regression discontinuity design—also with certain extensions of the 
original model—to identify class size effects on test scores. Recent studies from France using variants 
of this identification strategy find that smaller classes have a positive effect on student performance at 
both primary and secondary levels, although the magnitude of the estimated effects varies (Piketty, 
2004; Piketty and Valdenaire, 2006; Gary-Bobo and Hahjoub, 2006;). Among Nordic studies, 
Browning and Heinesen (2003) as well as Bingley, Myrup Jensen and Walker (2006) obtain the same 
result using Danish data. A recent study using Norwegian data in the Maimonides’ rule tradition, 
Leuven, Oosterbeek and Rønning (2006), uses basically the same pupil data as this paper. They find 
no effects of class size on pupil performance at age 16. Also Bonesrønning (2003) exploits restrictions 
on maximum class size to estimate the effect of class size on pupil performance among Norwegian 9th 
graders. He finds generally weak effects of class size, and the effect varies strongly with pupils’ family 
background as well as their effort. The maximum class size approach faces a problem of input 
substitution. School resources are multidimensional and not allocated in fixed proportions across 
schools. If restrictions apply to a subset of school inputs, and variations in restricted school inputs may 
be mitigated through substitution of other inputs, estimates based on exogenous variation in the 
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restricted input may produce biased results. For example, assume a maximum class size of 30 pupils. 
In a school with 28 pupils in one grade and 32 in another, class sizes will be 28 and 16, respectively. 
To the extent that teacher intensity matters for pupil performance, and that school principals and 
authorities care about equity across grades, they will allocate extra teaching resources, and even their 
best teachers, to the larger classes. In this case, using class size as the resource variable and regulations 
on class size as an instrument is problematic, because the instrument will be correlated with the error 
term in the achievement equation. As shown in Hægeland, Raaum and Salvanes (2004), this argument 
is also empirically relevant, because there is a positive correlation between class size and teacher hours 
per class in Norwegian lower secondary schools. In addition, “class size” is outdated as a well-defined 
input component in education production. The technology of teaching has changed over the last 15 
years, with larger variations in group size and teacher intensity per group across subjects (see Telhaug, 
1991; Cuban, 1994). It is far from evident that the size of the class captures the relevant cost 
components important for student performance.3 Consequently, teacher pupil ratios defined at the 
grade level represents a more relevant input measure, for methodological reasons as well as policy 
relevance. 
 Among other studies in the quasi-experimental tradition, Hoxby (2000) uses data from 
Connecticut in the US and relies on an experiment design in which cross-county variation in birth rates 
and rules that determine the minimum and maximum class size are used for identification. Hoxby 
concludes that the class size effect on pupil test scores is equal to zero. Hanushek, Rivkin and Taylor 
(1996) use US data at different levels of aggregation and estimate the effect of teacher–pupil ratios and 
teacher salaries on test scores and post-secondary education outcomes for high school students. They 
do not find any effect of school resources. Lindahl (2005) collected information for about 550 pupils 
from 16 schools in Stockholm during 1998 and 1999. The pupils took standardized tests in math at the 
end of the 5th grade, in the middle of the 6th grade and the end of the 6th grade. Using a value-added 
approach, he finds some support for pupils taught in small classes achieving better performance than 
those taught in large classes. Hakkinen, Kirjavainen and Uusitalo (2003) use Finnish data from the 
lower secondary level and estimate the effect of teacher expenditures on student test scores. The 
exogenous variation in municipality-level school spending caused by the dramatic recession in Finland 
in early 1990s is used as an identification strategy. They find no significant effects. Card and Krueger 
(1992) exploit a court ruling that caused randomized changes in school funding to determine the effect 
of school quality on the convergence of the black/white wage differential. They find reasonably strong 
                                                     
3
 In fact, regulations on maximum class size were abandoned in 2003 in Norway. Pupils are no longer connected to a fixed 
class at all times but to smaller or larger groups depending on the subject. During a typical school day, pupils are also 
grouped according to maturity or subject-specific competence. This practice has been common in the Nordic countries, even 
before the maximum class size regulations were abandoned. 
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effects of pupil/teacher ratios and teacher salaries on the black/white wage ratio. Card and Payne 
(2002) find that exogenous increases in funding of schools by state Supreme Court rulings improve 
tests scores in low-income areas compared with high-income areas. 
 Our approach exploits a particular feature of the Norwegian system for allocating 
resources across schools. Teaching of children up to age 16 and other local public services are 
provided at the municipality level.4 Richer local communities spend more on schools. A substantial 
number of local communities receive “exogenous” revenues, providing independent variation that 
helps identify causal effects of school inputs. We argue that the property tax revenues from 
hydropower plants located in the municipality, unlike other revenues, represent an income source that 
is orthogonal to unobserved characteristics of the pupils (that affect school performance). More 
institutional details are provided in sections 3 and 4. To avoid the problems of partly unobserved input 
substitution, we focus on comprehensive measures of school resources such as total expenditures and 
teacher hours per pupil. 
 Because both schools and the property taxes on hydro power plants are administered by 
the municipalities, our analysis is naturally carried out at the municipality level. The institutional setup 
calls for a standard instrumental variable (IV) approach where the estimator is based on the following 
two equations. 
(1) : m m m m mSchool resources SR a bFAMCOMP cMUNCTRL dHPTR u= + + + +  
(2) : m m m m mPupil performance A e g SR f FAMCOMP h MUNCTRL v= + + + + . 
 In the resources equation (1), we use teacher hours per pupil and total expenditures per 
pupil as the two alternative measures of SRm, where m indicates that all variables are at the 
municipality level. In addition to the hydropower tax revenue (HPTRm) used as the instrument, we 
include a number of municipality-level controls (MUNCTRLm) such as the number of pupils and 
travelling distances (see section 4 for a detailed discussion and definitions). In addition, we control for 
an extensive set of family background variables (see section 3 for details), aggregated up to 
municipality level (FAMCOMPm). In the outcome equation (2), our estimate of pupil performance is 
affected by SRm instrumented by HPTRm, conditional on all the other variables in the school resources 
equation. 
 The parameter of interest is g. The need for an instrument arises from the potential 
interdependence between um and υm. Sorting on unobserved pupil ability as well as compensating 
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 However, curriculum and teacher certification criteria are set at the national level. 
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resource allocation will generally create a correlation between these two residuals. If we estimate the 
outcome equation directly, a bias is likely to arise because of the correlation between school resource 
use (SRm) and the residual, υm. 
 Because we are estimating the equation at the municipality level, we construct an 
adjusted municipality performance index (Am). We estimate this municipality level outcome variable 
as the municipality fixed effect (αm) in a cross-section regression of individual performance (Λim), on 
gender, age, exam subject, all variables captured by Ci and a detailed set of family background 
characteristics (Fi). The equation is expressed as follows: 
(3) 
1
M
im m im i i im
m
M C Fα γ β ε
=
Λ = + + +∑ , 
where i denotes the individual, and Mim = 1 if pupil i graduated in municipality m, zero otherwise. 
Thus, lmmA α= . In order to take into account the grouping of pupils into municipalities and the use of 
estimated coefficients in (2), we utilize the FGLS estimation procedure described in Hanushek, Rivkin 
and Taylor. (1996).5 
 Norwegian municipalities are quite diverse along several dimensions. In our analysis, we 
focus on a subset of “comparable” municipalities with a similar school cost structure and exclude 
municipalities with a set of characteristics that predict particularly high or low expenditures (see 
section 4 for details). To complement the IV analysis, we also report estimates from a more flexible 
approach where the performance of pupils in communities with hydropower tax revenues is compared 
directly with outcomes of pupils in “neighbouring” municipalities. Neighbours are not defined by 
geographical closeness but by predicted school expenditures. This Wald estimator simply relates the 
performance differential and the observed resource differential, and the effect is defined as the ratio 
between the two. 
 Even with “exogenous” school resource allocation along the lines just described, 
problems related to mobility remain. Families and pupils move, and they sometimes cross 
municipality borders. The first problem related to mobility is that of endogenous location. Pupils tend 
to cluster non-randomly in schools because parents sort themselves into neighbourhoods and school 
districts. If these processes sort pupils with (dis)advantaged backgrounds into districts where schools 
have (low) high resource use, the effect of school resources on pupil achievement is upward biased. 
                                                     
5
 The estimation procedure is as follows: (1) and (2) are first estimated by ordinary two-stage least squares. The square of the 
residuals from (2) are then regressed on the sampling variance of the municipality fixed effects, mαˆ , from (3). The inverses 
of the predicted squares of the residuals from this regression are used as weights in the two-stage feasible generalized least 
squares estimation of (1) and (2). 
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Peer effects, where pupils benefit from having clever schoolmates, are likely to reinforce this. Both 
effects may be empirically relevant in our setting, because it is public information that municipalities 
with hydropower plants tend to spend more on, and presumably offer a higher quality of, local public 
goods such as schools. Conditioning on a very rich set of family characteristics partly solves the 
problem, but there may still be biases because of unobserved ability. It is not obvious, however, that 
families with high-ability children are the most likely to locate in municipalities with HPTR. On the 
one hand, parents with children who (are expected to) need special attention or supervision, might 
have extra incentives to move into a community with extra resources. On the other hand, education-
oriented parents are more likely to move into high-resource areas. Consequently, sorting on 
unobserved variables may affect the estimate, but there is no obvious direction of the potential bias. 
 The second problem is related to the “exposure period” and adequate measures of 
resources. Pupils accumulate skills over time, and their performance at age 16 will typically reflect 
school input throughout their whole career, not only the resources experienced during the final three 
years as observed in our data (see Todd and Wolpin, 2003). As a consequence of mobility among 
pupils during their school age, the effects of school resources tend to be downward biased because of 
measurement error. Moving pupils have been exposed to resources different from those observed at 
the time of graduation. 
 Our main analysis does not address the problem of endogenous location explicitly. 
However, detailed information on the municipality of residence and migration patterns of pupils and 
parents across municipalities over a long period of time enables us to study mobility patterns and 
“test” implications of mobility by estimating school resource effects, conditional on seniority in the 
municipality of graduation. More specifically, we estimate the effect of school resources, conditional 
on graduation in the municipality of birth, and also on whether the mother lived in the graduation 
municipality in 1980, seven years before the child was born. 
 Another aspect that our approach does not control for is that municipalities may allocate 
resources in a compensatory way across schools within the municipality. This is because our 
exogenous variation for identifying resource use is at the municipality level and not at the school level. 
Less resources are allocated to schools with pupils who are expected to perform well (for a given 
school environment), and more teacher hours are provided for schools with less “able” children. 
Compensating resource allocation implies that a pupil characteristic that has a positive effect on 
achievement also has a negative effect on resource variables and will bias estimates downward if the 
actual characteristic is not controlled for. It is important to note, however, that within municipalities, 
compensating resource allocation will only bias our results in so far as the resource effects vary across 
the ability distribution. 
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3. Data and institutional features 
School districts 
Norwegian municipalities operate schools to provide compulsory education (1st–10th grades, ages 6–
16). They also provide basic health services, organized care for children and the elderly, and 
infrastructure like water and sewage, and they support a variety of cultural activities. Compulsory 
schooling accounts for, on average, about 29% of their total expenditures.6 Municipal activities are 
financed by a local income tax, a “poll tax” in terms of housing-related utility charges, and property 
taxes, as well as redistributive transfers from the central government (see Borge and Rattsø, 2004). In 
addition to the local income tax with a capped rate, municipalities are allowed to impose a property 
tax, which accounts for a maximum of 0.7% of their tax base. About one-half of the municipalities 
currently have a property tax, and nearly all of these apply the maximum rate. Houses in “town-like” 
areas as well as physical capital of firms (buildings, machinery etc) may be taxed. Many 
municipalities choose to exclude houses from the property tax, in order to reduce the tax burden on 
their own residents. The municipality is free to implement a property tax on production 
facilities/plants, including hydropower plants. This property tax applies to all businesses, but the tax 
base (asset value) may be set low to avoid large taxes on locally owned firms. 
School resources 
We consider two alternative measures of school resources. Both are constructed as averages across 
schools at the municipality level, covering the three years prior to graduation to reflect school inputs 
during the period when the pupil attended lower secondary school. 
 Teacher hours. Every school provides annual information on (i) the number of pupils by 
grade and (ii) the total hours of instruction for 8th–10th grades to the Norwegian Compulsory School 
Information System (GSI). Traditionally, instruction has taken place within classes, but the number of 
teachers occupied with pupils belonging to a given class varies across subjects, classes, grades and 
schools. 
 Expenditures. Municipalities annually report expenditures by sector of activity to 
Statistics Norway. We use total expenditure on primary and lower secondary schools (1st–10th grades, 
ages 6–16) per pupil, excluding transport of pupils and costs associated with after-school, non-
curricular activities (“SFO”). This expenditure measure covers wage costs for teachers and other 
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 Statistics Norway: Net expenditures primary and lower secondary education, as percentage of all net expenditures, average 
all municipalities (Statistikkbanken: netto driftsutgifter grunnskole i prosent av samlete nettoutgifter, 2005, gjennomsnitt alle 
kommuner.) 
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personnel, cleaning services, heating and lightning, teaching equipment, ICT, library services and 
maintenance of buildings. Norway spends more on primary and secondary schools than most other 
OECD countries. The cumulative expenditures on educational institutions per student over the 
duration of primary and lower secondary education exceed US$80,000 (in 2003 prices), which is very 
close to what is spent in the United States. Among OECD countries, only Luxembourg spends more 
(see OECD, 2006). 
Pupil achievement at age 16 
Our sample covers all pupils who completed compulsory education in Norway (10th grade in the lower 
secondary school) in 2003. Individual marks by subject, individual characteristics and family 
background variables are collected from administrative registers. In principle there is no attrition, but a 
small minority of pupils are dropped from the dataset because of missing family information. Data are 
collected by the Directorate for Primary and Secondary Education and contain information on which 
school the individual graduated from, as well as marks by subject. Marks are awarded on a scale from 
one to six (higher marks indicating better performance). This study focuses on performance in the final 
written examination at the end of 10th grade. The exam mark is based on a five-hour test in one of the 
core subjects of Mathematics, Norwegian or English. All pupils in the country do the same (subject-
specific) test. Pupils are randomly allocated to subjects, and the marking is anonymous and done by 
external examiners. 
Pupil characteristics and their family background 
To measure Ci and Fi in equation (3), detailed information on pupil and family characteristics along a 
number of dimensions are taken from several administrative registers. All variables are constructed for 
the year in which the pupil graduates. 
 Demographic information and family structure: We include dummy variables for the 
pupil’s gender, quarter of birth (given graduation in the year they turn 16) and graduation in years 
earlier or later than expected according to their age. Parents’ marital status is measured by means of 
dummies reflecting whether they are married (to each other), cohabitants, separated, divorced or none 
of these, and dummy variables indicating whether the father and/or mother is unknown. The age of the 
mother and father at the birth of their first child is represented by dummy variables reflecting age 
intervals. Another detailed set of dummies reflects the number of full siblings, the number of half 
siblings and the rank in the birth order (of full siblings). 
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 Parents’ education: Educational attainment is classified into four categories: lower 
secondary, upper secondary, lower tertiary and higher tertiary education. Based on this classification, 
we construct dummy variables for all combinations of father’s and mother’s education. 
Immigrant status: Pupils with both parents born abroad are classified as immigrants. We distinguish 
between 15 countries/regions of origin by means of dummy variables. Age at immigration for the 
pupil is defined by intervals distinguishing between those who were born in Norway or who 
immigrated before they were three years old, and those who immigrated when they were 3–5, 5–7, 7–
9, 9–11, 11–13 or 13 years or more. 
 Economic resources, unemployment, disability pension and social assistance: As the 
permanent economic resources of the family may be more important than current income during the 
final school years, family income is defined as the sum of the father’s and mother’s taxable labour 
income during the last 10 years (regardless of marital status). Dummy variables reflect the position 
(quintile) in the family income distribution. 
 Family wealth for the pupil is defined as the sum of the father’s and mother’s individual 
taxable wealth for the year prior to graduation. Because wealth typically increases over the working 
part of the life cycle, we construct age-specific wealth distributions, where we divide families into 
five-year age intervals based on the average age of the parents. Dummy variables reflect whether the 
family belongs to one of the upper four deciles of its age-specific wealth distribution. (A majority of 
families have negative taxable wealth. The tax value of housing, which is the most common non-
financial asset, is far below market value. Negative taxable wealth is reported as zero.) 
 Unemployment records are used to construct variables for the incidence of unemployment 
for the parents during the 10 years prior to the pupil’s graduation. We ignore short unemployment 
spells and define a person as unemployed if he or she was registered as unemployed for at least three 
months of a calendar year. We construct dummy variables, separately for mother and father, for 
unemployment in the graduation year, and for unemployment one, two, three, four and five or more 
years during the 10-year period prior to graduation. Similarly, we construct variables indicating the 
receipt of a disability pension and social assistance. We define a person as on a disability pension if he 
or she received disability pensions for more than six months of the calendar year. Our criterion for 
defining a person as receiving social assistance is that he or she received at least NOK 20,000 (approx 
US$2,850) in a given year. Dummy variables for disability pensions and social assistance are 
constructed in the same manner as for unemployment. 
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4. Instrumenting school resources 
Our identification strategy rests on the idea that richer local communities spend more on schools, see 
Aaberge and Langørgen (2003) for Norwegian evidence. Revenue variation across municipalities is 
partly generated by differences in what municipalities receive as income tax from their residents. 
Consequently, local government revenues are presumably not orthogonal to pupil composition. For 
example, children of high-income families tend to live in affluent local communities with high levels 
of tax revenues. Although the Norwegian state transfer system is highly redistributive, as higher local 
income taxes trigger reduced transfers from the central government, municipality revenues may be 
correlated with the ability of pupils.7 To satisfy appropriate exclusion restrictions, we need an 
“exogenous” component of municipality tax revenues. In the Norwegian case, location of hydropower 
plants in combination with a local property tax constitutes a promising candidate because, basically, 
nature and available technology determine the location of hydropower plants and thereby the access to 
an immobile tax source. Hydropower technology was introduced about 100 years ago, and many of the 
power plants were established around that time. This timing of events therefore avoids the potential 
connection between location of plants and pupil ability that could exist if entrepreneurial people, with 
clever children, clustered in areas with power plant investments.8 
Local property taxes from hydropower plants 
Information on local government revenues generated by tax on hydropower plants (HPTR) is not 
readily available, but we have collected data specifically for this study. Only total yearly property tax 
revenues are reported by the municipalities to Statistics Norway. By means of information on the 
property values for the around 800 hydropower “plants” (including dams and reservoirs) and detailed 
information on their locations (needed because a single “plant” can have facilities in more than 10 
municipalities)9, we calculate the share of the total property tax in 2002 that can be attributed to 
hydropower plants. Unlike taxes on other properties, these are typically paid by companies with 
owners outside the local community. Therefore, nearly all municipalities with waterfalls have 
implemented the maximum tax of 0.7% of the asset value of the hydropower facilities. Because a 
single hydropower plant often has reservoirs in more than one municipality, the asset value of each 
                                                     
7
 See, for instance, Aaberge and Langørgen (2003) for an assessment of the degree of redistribution across municipalities in 
the Norwegian tax system. 
8
 One could argue that intergenerational transfer of skills would imply that descendents of the entrepreneurs are a selected 
group of pupils, but the relatively low earnings persistence across generations in Norway (see Bratsberg et al., 2007) suggest 
than any such sorting effect would  be negligible within a two- or three-generation perspective. 
9
 The tax base, or property value, is determined by the net present value of the plant’s revenues and costs. In 2002, however, 
the value of all plants was subject to a minimum value, proportional to the average production during the previous five years. 
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plant (tax base) is distributed across local governments according to percentages determined by The 
Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE). 
 We calculate the share of property taxes related to hydropower plants in 2002, and we 
multiply this by yearly total property taxes to get an estimate of the average annual hydropower 
property tax during 1992–2000, by municipality. We deliberately use the permanent level of HPTR 
because local authorities are expected to smooth consumption. Local politicians are unlikely to adjust 
school spending to transitory shocks in HPTR.10 
Determination of school resources 
To provide information about the scaling of variables, Table 1 describes the distribution of resources 
across municipalities, based on all municipalities with valid information on all variables. On average, 
expenditures per pupil are around NOK 54,250 (US$7,800). The variation is substantial, as the 10th 
percentile spends NOK 43,900 (US$6,300) and the 90th percentile spends NOK 68,600 (US$9,800). 
For comparison, Hanushek, Rivkin and Taylor (1996) report that expenditures across US states in the 
early 1990s varied between US$2,960 and US$8,645. Among municipalities without hydropower 
revenues, average expenditures are lower. The variation in teacher hours across all municipalities is 
also substantial with a 90–10 log-differential of about 0.62. As for total expenditures, teacher hours 
per pupil are lower in municipalities without HPTR. 
 
                                                     
10
 For the same reason, the difference-in-difference IV approach exploiting changes in HPTR within municipalities using 
multiple pupil cohorts is inadequate. 
16 
Table 1: School resources, HPTR and municipality characteristics 
 (1) All municipalities (2) Municipalities without HPTR 
(3) Comparable 
municipalities 
 
Expenditures 
(NOK 
10,000) 
Ln Teaching 
hours Expenditures 
Ln Teaching 
hours Expenditures 
Ln Teaching 
hours 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
Average  5.43 4.54 5.21 4.50 5.44 4.52 
Standard dev 1.11   .25 1.03   .25   .97   .20 
10th percentile 4.39 4.26 4.28 4.25 4.44 4.28 
90th percentile 6.86 4.89 6.60 4.89 6.69 4.82 
Panel B. OLS        
Pupils/10000 –3.27 (.054) –8.37 (1.21) –3.17 (.616) –0.834 (.014) –29.0(3.48) –6.41(.764) 
Pupils2/107 1.86 (.037) .047 (.0083) 1.76(.414) .461 (.095) 14.9(25.9) 3.16(.559) 
Pupils3/1012 –2.47 (.058) –.061 (.013) –2.32 (0.65) –.612(.149) –2.41 (0.54) –50.0 (11.4) 
Travelling distance 
(neighbour) .176 (.021) .040 (.005) .163 (.028) .044 (.0066) .083 (.025) .018 (.005) 
Travelling distance (zone) .020 (.007) .002 (.0016) .0152 (.011) .001 (.002) .041 (.007) .008 (.002) 
Fraction mentally 
retarded 87 (62) 1.07 (14) 138 (80) 22 (18) 130 (52) 14 (11) 
Political left majority .171 (.084) .031 (.019) .263 (.116) .047 (.027) .072 (.073) .020 (.158) 
Fraction tertiary 
education  3.54 (1.54) .554 (.347) 5.66 (1.90) .919 (.451) –.150 (1.43) .070 (.312) 
Pupil composition, parental characteristics 
Fraction tertiary ed. –1.050(.150) –.854 (.347) –1.63 (1.87) –.982 (.431) –.067 (1.33) –.144 (.290) 
Fraction upper secondary 
ed. –.686 (.138) –.900 (.311) –.445 (1.75) –873 (.404) –1.28 (1.24) –.400 (.267) 
Family earnings       
Fraction in quintile 1 –1.59 (.860) –.317(.194) –2.01 (1.24) –.406 (.285) –.468 (.725) –.326 (.156) 
Fraction in quintile 2 –2.06 (.942) –.368 (.212) –.872 (1.34) –.304 (.308) –.598 (.780) –.273 (.173) 
Fraction in quintile 4 –.06 (1.07) –.442 (.242) .361 (1.44) –.286 (.331) 1.61 (.986) –.528 (.213) 
Fraction in quintile 5 –2.31 (.922) –.368 (.209) –2.56 (1.17) –.501 (.68) –.219 (.860) .190 (.185) 
Fraction unemployed 2.98 (1.18) .913 (.265) 5.11 (1.46) 1.15 (.337) 1.79 (1.01) .675 (.219) 
Fraction with disability 
pension . 156(.982) –.036 (.225) –.605 (1.33) –.013 (.307) .984 (.851) .051 (.185) 
Fraction on welfare 
benefits .94 (1.85) .201 (.417) 1.70 (2.46) –.090 (.565) 2.13 (1.52) .425 (.330) 
Fraction non-Western 
immigrants –.66 (2.05) –.282 (.462) –.701 (2.48) –.149 (.572) –.081 (1.85) –.011 (.395) 
HPTR per capita (NOK 
10,000) .89 (.13) .065 (.030)   .77 (.011) .055 (.023) 
# Municipalities    429    429     299     299    373    376 
# Pupils 51483 51483 43377 43377 26428 27485 
Adj R2  .556   .541    .451    .495    .648   .664 
Marg. Adj R2  .053  .0047 Na Na   .050   .004 
Note: # of pupils (as a municipality characteristic) refers to 1st–10th grades for expenditures and 8th–10th grades 
for teacher hours. 
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 The coefficients of the school resource regressions are displayed in Table 1, Panel B. The 
first two columns show how HPTR influences the level of resources, conditional on other municipality 
characteristics. The effect of hydropower tax revenues on expenditures is significantly positive, with a 
t-value of about seven. The point estimate is close to unity: If hydropower tax revenues per capita 
increase by one NOK, expenditures per pupil increase by NOK 0.89. The effect on log teacher hours 
per pupil is estimated to be 0.065, which says that an extra NOK 10,000 in hydropower tax revenues 
per capita raises teacher hours by about 6.5%. However, the t-value is just above two, indicating that 
HPTR is a weaker instrument for teacher hours per pupil. 
 Given local government revenues, the level of school resources is influenced by 
preferences of the electorate in the municipality and the local cost structure for operating schools. 
Panel B includes estimates of cost-related expenditure determinants like the number of pupils, 
travelling distances measured by average travelling minutes from the centre of own neighbourhood to 
the next (“neighbour”) and to the municipality centre (“zone”), as well as the proportion of disabled 
children. Expenditures related to schools are fundamentally linked to the size of the school-age 
population. This is particularly so in communities with a scattered population, as limits on acceptable 
commuting distances generate sizeable economies of scale. Expenditures per pupil are, for small and 
medium sized municipalities, decreasing in the number of pupils. Locations of houses, and thereby the 
travelling distances of pupils, affect costs via the number of schools. Longer distances cause 
expenditures and teacher hours to rise. Disabled children are typically integrated in local schools with 
additional resources. To account for the presence of pupils requiring extra resources, we include the 
share of mentally disabled pupils aged 6–16, as well as a number of family background characteristics 
of the graduating pupils; the shares of parents with tertiary education and upper secondary school, as 
well as the shares who are unemployed, receiving welfare transfers or disability pension, and the share 
of non-western immigrants as defined in section 3.11 
 The family background of the actual pupils affects the resources through compensating 
resource allocation. When pupils have a more privileged family background, fewer resources are 
allocated to schools. The positive signs on unemployment are clear evidence of this practice, and the 
negative effects of higher parental education point in the same direction. The results for family 
                                                     
11
 We do not simultaneously model the municipality supply of different services. For example, via the budget constraint, 
changes in the elderly population that generate an increased level of services in care for the elderly may affect resources 
allocated to schools (Aaberge and Langørgen, 2003). Actually, we have included variables that affect other types of 
municipality expenditures, like the age distribution of the population, but they do not seem to have any effect on school 
spending. 
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earnings, i.e., the fractions in the lower and upper quintiles, are mixed, but the high correlation 
between family characteristics makes it hard to get precise estimates of each of them.12 
 The priorities of the local council and its constituency seem to affect school resources. A 
politically left local majority and a more educated electorate (share of the adult population with higher 
education) have a positive influence on school resources, but the coefficients are not always 
significant. 
Comparable and neighbouring municipalities 
The municipalities with hydropower tax revenues are not representative in terms of community 
characteristics. They are typically small communities with scattered populations and longer travelling 
distances. This heterogeneity may generate correlations between expenditure determinants, 
hydropower tax revenues and unobserved factors affecting pupil performance. In order to limit 
potential bias because of selectivity of HPTR municipalities, we focus mainly on “comparable 
municipalities” defined as the subset that holds a similar level of predicted expenditures. We define 
comparable municipalities as those who hold predicted expenditures (teacher hours) within the range 
observed among municipalities with and without HPTR. To predict school resources we use estimates 
from the sample of municipalities without hydropower tax revenues (column (2) in Table 1). 
 In Figures 1 and 2, we first compare municipalities with HPTR (Panel A) and without 
HPTR (Panel B) and display the kernel densities of the predicted level of expenditures and teacher 
hours, respectively. The comparable communities for expenditures lie in the range of NOK 45,000 to 
78,000 per pupil and for log teacher hours between 4.30 and 5.09. As will be clear below, our main 
effects will partly be driven by outcomes in municipalities with high HPTR. The C panels display the 
distributions in these communities. Basically we exclude municipalities with extremely low and, to 
some extent, high levels of predicted resources per pupil, illustrated by the vertical cut-off lines in 
Figures 1 and 2. Municipalities with low costs typically have more pupils than the largest among those 
with hydropower tax revenues. 
                                                     
12
 If we use the average predicted individual performance of the pupils based on micro level family characteristics, instead of 
aggregated family characteristics, we get a significant negative estimate clearly supporting the existence of compensating 
resource allocation. 
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 Considering the set of comparable municipalities, Table 2 displays the means of 
municipality characteristics, by level of hydropower tax revenues. We have already shown that 
municipalities with positive HPTR use more resources, and the numbers are displayed in the first two 
rows. However, low levels of HPTR appear to have no effect on school resources. 
 
Table 2:  School resources per pupil and municipality characteristics, by hydropower tax 
revenue among comparable municipalities (mean values) 
 Comparable municipalities 
 No HPTR Low HPTR Medium HPTR High HPTR 
Municipality level 
Expenditures per pupil (NOK) 52,598 52,578 58,016 64,497 
Teaching hours per pupil  93.8 89.5 106.6 111.4 
HPTR per capita (NOK) 0 402 1,270 6,797 
Pupils in 1st–10th grades 872 1,095 502 376 
Travelling distance (neighbour) 3.51 3.10 4.03 5.08 
Travelling distance (zone) 7.93 8.01 9.52 11.28 
Left majority .236 .364 .342 .250 
Fraction tertiary education .164 .171 .146 .157 
Fraction mentally retarded, 6–15 .073 .057 .064 .063 
Pupil composition, parental characteristics 
Fraction with tertiary education  .317 .332 .290 .306 
Fraction with secondary education .632 .627 .662 .645 
Family earnings     
Fraction in quintile 1 .207 .205 .250 .242 
Fraction in quintile 2 .251 .252 .268 .260 
Fraction in quintile 4 .184 .186 .157 .159 
Fraction in quintile 5 .108 .100 .071 .078 
Fraction unemployed .061 .052 .057 .051 
Fraction with disability pension .104 .109 .111 .100 
Fraction on welfare benefits .035 .034 .039 .032 
Fraction non-Western immigrants .022 .021 .021 .015 
# Municipalities  250 44 38 44 
Note: Sample of municipalities with comparable (predicted) expenditures per pupil. Sample characteristics are 
very similar for municipalities with comparable levels of teacher hours per pupil. Expenditure per pupil refers to 
1st–10th grades, while teacher hours per pupil covers 8th–10th grades. 
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 Municipalities with HPTR are also different from other municipalities along a number of 
other dimensions. They are smaller in terms of average number of pupils, and travelling distances are 
somewhat longer. HPTR municipalities are more likely to have a politically left majority, but the 
fraction of voters with tertiary education is of a similar magnitude. There is no systematic difference 
according to the observed family background of the pupils. As HPTR is determined by nature 
(topography), a possible concern is that HPTR serves as a proxy for geographical location and hence 
reflects regional effects that may affect resources and (unobserved) pupil ability. Figure 3 illustrates 
that municipalities with HPTR are widely scattered across the country although many are located in 
the central, high-altitude areas of the southern part of Norway. 
 
Figure 3: Geographical location of municipalities, by hydropower property tax revenue 
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 Returning to the power of the instrument, we find that the effects of HPTR on resource 
use are slightly lower when we restrict the analysis to municipalities with a comparable expenditure 
structure (see column (3) (comparable municipalities) in Table 1, which are the first-stage regressions 
in our IV analysis). However, even across comparable municipalities, HPTR is a powerful instrument 
for school spending. Figure 4 displays the relationship between HPTR and residual expenditures (left) 
and teacher hours (right). (Residual expenditures are defined as the difference between observed and 
predicted expenditures based on parameters in column (3) of Table 1.) In other words, the two figures 
display the effects of the instrument, conditional on municipality characteristics that affect variation in 
cost structure and priorities. Basically, the figures indicate that, first, the effects of the instrument are 
not totally driven by extremely rich municipalities and, second, linearity seems to be a fairly good 
approximation. We see that there is a larger effect of HPTR on expenditures per pupil than on teacher 
hours per pupil. Thus, HPTR is a stronger instrument for the former resource measure. For teacher 
hours, there are also some outliers with high HPTR, but excluding these municipalities does not 
qualitatively affect our findings. 
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Our Wald estimator in section 5 is based on a comparison of pupil performance in municipalities with 
and without HPTR. In order to make the Wald estimates as comparable as possible to the regression 
results, we make the two groups as equal as possible by matching municipalities. The matching 
procedure follows the “nearest neighbours” principle, where neighbourhood is determined by cost 
structure, not by geographical location. The idea is that differences in resource use between two 
municipalities that are similar according to the factors that determine the costs of providing schooling 
at a given standard can be used for comparing pupil outcomes. The matching approach compares two 
sets of municipalities, where one is “rich” because of HPTR and the other is less affluent (within each 
pair). The hydropower tax revenues imply that more resources are allocated to schools in the richer 
communities. Based on the school resource models in column (2) of Table 1, we calculate predicted 
school resources, given observed municipality characteristics, and we select for each HPTR 
municipality its five closest neighbours. We have chosen to include more than one neighbour to reduce 
the variance in both resources and performance. The disadvantage of including more neighbours (i.e., 
less precise matches are therefore a potential bias) is limited because the differences in predicted 
resources between potential neighbours are fairly small. 
 In Tables 3A and 3B, Panel A, we report the level of school resources in the 
municipalities with HPTR and their neighbours. Municipalities with low HPTR have higher 
expenditures on schools than their neighbours (see Table 3A), but their teacher/pupil ratios are almost 
identical (see Table 3B). When HPTR is substantial, municipalities spend more on schools and have 
more teachers than their neighbours. The B panels of both tables display the mean characteristics of 
the HPTR municipalities and their neighbours. HPTR municipalities are typically smaller and tend to 
have longer travelling distances. Other municipality characteristics are fairly similar, but there is a 
tendency for HPTR municipalities to have characteristics that contribute to lower spending, 
counteracting the effects of size and travel distances. 
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Table 3A:  Municipality characteristics, by level of HPTR and their five nearest (matched) 
neighbours: Expenditure sample (mean values) 
 Low HPTR Medium HPTR High HPTR 
 
Low 
Matched 
(with 
HPTR = 0) 
Medium 
Matched 
(with 
HPTR = 0) 
High 
Matched 
(with 
HPTR = 0) 
A. Expenditure per pupil 
 52,578 50,793 58,016 53,333 64,497 55,832 
B. Municipality characteristics 
HPTR per capita .402 0 1,270 0 6,797 .0 
# pupils 1095 986 502 668 376 514 
Travelling distance 
(neighbour) 3.10 3.22 4.03 3.98 5.08 4.40 
Travelling distance 
(zone) 8.01 7.05 9.53 8.81 11.28 9.53 
Political left 
majority .364 .227 .342 .242 .250 .259 
Fraction tertiary 
education .171 .167 .146 .154 .157 .156 
Fraction mentally 
retarded .0006 .0007 .0006 .0007 .0006 .0007 
Pupil composition, parental characteristics 
Fraction with tertiary 
education  .332 .322 .299 .302 .306 .302 
Fraction with sec. 
education .627 .631 .662 .647 .645 .642 
Family earnings       
Fraction in quintile 1 .205 .195 .250 .208 .242 .214 
Fraction in quintile 2 .252 .248 .268 .265 .260 .270 
Fraction in quintile 4 .186 .188 .157 .178 .159 .180 
Fraction in quintile 5 .100 .120 .071 .094 .078 .082 
Fraction 
unemployed .052 .056 .057 .059 .051 .069 
Fraction with 
disability pension .109 .105 .111 .102 .100 .106 
Fraction on welfare 
benefits .034 .032 .039 .033 .032 .034 
Fraction non-
Western immigrant .021 .023 .021 .018 .015 .017 
# Municipalities 44 44·5 38 38·5 44 44·5 
25 
Table 3B:  Municipality characteristics, by level of HPTR and their five nearest (matched) 
neighbours: Teacher hours sample (mean values) 
 Low HPTR Medium HPTR High HPTR 
 
Low 
Matched 
(with 
HPTR = 0) 
Medium 
Matched 
(with 
HPTR = 0) 
High 
Matched 
(with 
HPTR = 0) 
A. Teacher hours per pupils 
 89.49 87.02 107.00 97.51 111.38 101.0 
B. Municipality characteristics 
HPTR per capita 402 .0 1,270 .0 6,797 .0 
# pupils 1095 1050 504 649 376 535 
Travelling distance 
(neighbour) 3.10 3.11 4.25 4.05 5.08 4.52 
Travelling distance 
(zone) 8.01 7.37 10.06 9.02 11.28 9.90 
Political left 
majority .364 .200 .316 .237 .250 .305 
Fraction tertiary 
education .171 .171 .146 .152 .157 .152 
Fraction mentally 
retarded .0006 .0007 .0007 .0007 .0006 .0007 
Pupil composition, parental characteristics 
Fraction with tertiary 
education  .332 .328 .287 .305 .306 .302 
Fraction with sec. 
education .627 .628 .665 .642 .645 .642 
Family earnings       
Fraction in quintile 1 .205 .200 .254 .217 .242 .229 
Fraction in quintile 2 .251 .247 .268 .269 .260 .266 
Fraction in quintile 4 .186 .186 .156 .172 .159 .168 
Fraction in quintile 5 .100 .118 .071 .088 .078 .080 
Fraction 
unemployed .052 .056 .058 .065 .051 .072 
Fraction with 
disability pension .109 .103 .115 .107 .100 .107 
Fraction on welfare 
benefits .034 .032 .039 .033 .032 .035 
Fraction non-
Western immigrant .021 .024 .021 .018 .015 0.19 
# Municipalities 44 44*5 38 38*5 44 44*5 
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5. School resource effects 
We start the presentation of the results first by showing performance differentials for neighbouring 
(matched) municipalities. The logic of our identification strategy builds on the idea that effects are 
defined by different, and presumably superior, performance among students in HPTR municipalities. 
Column (1) in Table 4 displays the performance differentials, measured by average exam marks, the 
proportion with “basic skills” (mark above 2) and the proportion with high skills (mark 5 or 6). These 
differentials are adjusted for family background characteristics as discussed in section 2, i.e., 
l
mm
A α=  from estimation of (3). When we compare all HPTR municipalities with their matched 
neighbours, the differential in average marks is .032, and an equal percentage obtains basic skills (.007 
differential in Panel II), while more pupils get the highest scores (.019 differential in Panel III) in 
HPTR municipalities. Except for the proportion of pupils with high skills, the differentials are not 
significant. It is evident from rows 2 to 4 in Panels I–III that the positive performance differentials are 
larger for municipalities with high levels of HPTR, for which even the mean differential is clearly 
significant. 
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Table 4:  School resources and pupil performance: Wald estimates based on neighbouring 
municipalities 
 (1) 
Marks 
Differential 
(2) 
Wald 
Expenditures 
(NOK 10,000) 
(3) 
Wald 
Ln 
(Teacher hours)/10 
I. Mean (on scale 1 to 6) 
HPTR > 0 vs no  .032 
(.020) 
.070 
(.046) 
.044 
(.024)* 
Low HPTR vs no .021 
(.029) 
.106 
(.165) 
.008 
(.043) 
Med HPTR vs no –.019 
(.030) 
–.039 
(.065) 
–.012 
(.029) 
High HPTR vs no 
 
.111 
(.048)** 
.113 
(.050)** 
.117 
(.041)*** 
II. Basic skills (proportion with mark > 2) 
HPTR > 0 vs no  .007 
(.009) 
.015 
(.020) 
.019 
(.011)* 
Low HPTR vs no .002 
(.016) 
.010 
(.086) 
.009 
(.020) 
Med HPTR vs no –.001 
(.017) 
–.002 
(.034) 
.007 
(.014) 
High HPTR vs no 
 
.023 
(.014) 
.025 
(.016) 
.036 
(.021)* 
III. High skills (proportion with mark 5 or 6) 
HPTR > 0 vs no .019 
(.007) 
.041 
(.017)** 
.018 
(.008)** 
Low HPTR vs no .006 
(.011) 
.027 
(.047) 
.001 
(.014) 
Med HPTR vs no .017 
(.010) 
.032 
(.022) 
.009 
(.010) 
High HPTR vs no 
 
.052 
(.017)*** 
.056 
(.018)*** 
.041 
(.012)*** 
 Note: Wald estimates based on (Mean Differential Performance/Mean Differential Resources). Resource 
differentials are displayed in Table 3. The reported performance differentials in column (1) are for the 
expenditure-matched sample, but the differentials for the teacher hours-matched samples are very similar. The 
log (teacher hours per pupil) estimate is divided by 10 to have an interpretation of (approximately) a 10% 
increase in teacher hours per pupil. Standard errors are in parentheses. */**/*** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%/5%/1% level respectively. Observations (matched pairs) are weighted with the inverse of the sum 
standard errors of the estimated municipality performance effects. 
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 Columns (2) and (3) in Table 4 provide the Wald estimates, which relate the average 
outcome differentials in column (1) to the respective resource differentials by simply calculating the 
ratio between the two. We see the Wald statistics based on these differentials as preliminaries, or 
advanced descriptive statistics. Considering all HPTR municipalities, the effect on average 
performance is positive for both teacher hours and expenditures, but the latter is not statistically 
significant. A 10% increase in teacher hours per pupil is estimated to raise marks by .044, which 
amounts to a one level improvement for one in every 25 pupils. 
 At the lower end of the achievement distribution, the Wald estimator suggests a small and 
positive effect on basic skills (Panel II) from increased teacher hours, but again only significant at the 
10% level. Higher expenditures do not seem to have any effect on basic skills when we compare (all) 
municipalities with and without HPTR. The impact on the proportion with high skills is larger and 
significant (Panel III), with estimates equal to .041 and .018 for expenditures and teacher hours, 
respectively. 
 The positive effects of school resources seem to be driven mainly by the outcomes of 
high-HPTR municipalities. When we split by level of HPTR, no significant effects are found based on 
municipalities with low or moderate HPTR. Pupils in municipalities with high HPTR, however, have 
significantly better performance than pupils in neighbouring communities. The Wald estimates are all 
significant, except for basic skills. All in all, the Wald estimates of Table 4 clearly suggest that (large) 
differences in school resources do matter. 
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Table 5:  School resources and pupil performance; Comparable municipalities: OLS and IV 
estimates 
 
(1) 
OLS 
No controls 
(2) 
Family 
background 
adjusted 
OLS 
 
(3) 
Family 
background 
adjusted + 
municipality 
characteristics. 
OLS 
(4) 
IV 
Panel A. Effect of increased expenditures (NOK 10,000) per pupil on 
I. Mean  .005 
(.015) 
.029 
(.013)** 
–.014 
(.021) 
.181 
(.063)*** 
II. Basic skills –.002 
(.005) 
.006 
(.004) 
–.012 
(.007) 
.040 
(.019)** 
III. High skills .000 
(.004) 
.007 
(.004) 
–.004 
(.007) 
.048 
(.021)** 
Panel B. Effect of more teacher hours (ln(hours per pupil)/10) on 
I. Mean  .004 
(.006) 
.018 
(.006)*** 
.001 
(.010) 
.252 
(.124)** 
II. Basic skills .001 
(.002) 
.005 
(.002)*** 
–.001 
(.003) 
.048 
(.026)* 
III. High skills .001 
(.002) 
       0.004 
     (0.002)** 
.001 
(.003) 
.068 
(.037)* 
Family 
characteristics No Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality 
controls  No No Yes Yes 
# Municipalities  373/376 373/376 373/376 373/376 
 Note: Dependent variables are average marks (row I), fraction with basic skills (row II) and highly skilled (row 
III) at the municipality level. Standard errors are in parentheses. */**/*** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%/5%/1% level respectively. Observations are weighted as described in section 2. 
 
 Turning now to our preferred IV approach, the main results are given in Table 5. Column 
(1) reports the bivariate least squares regression coefficients and reveals that school resources are 
basically uncorrelated with measures of pupil performance in comparable municipalities. However, if 
compensating resource allocation to improve achievement among low-ability pupils is important, the 
effects of school resources are biased downwards unless we control for pupil composition. When we 
condition according to individual family background, we do find significantly positive effects of 
expenditures as well as teacher hours (see column (2) in Table 5). This pattern is consistent with an 
allocation of resources where more needy pupils attract extra money to schools. 
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The IV estimates are reported in column (4). More resources in terms of higher expenditures do have a 
significantly positive effect on pupil performance. Additional expenditure of NOK 10,000 per pupil is 
estimated to raise average marks by .181. Thus, every fifth or sixth pupil will have his/her exam mark 
raised by one level if the municipality spends NOK 10,000 more annually on each of them in school. 
An extra 10% in teacher hours per pupil raises the average mark by about .252, i.e., a one-level rise for 
one in every four pupils (see column (4) in Panel B). It should be noted, however, that the precision of 
these estimates is not impressive. Standard errors are one-third to one-half of the estimated 
coefficients, indicating that the lower bounds of the confidence intervals are close to zero. 
 When we look at the resource effects across the performance distribution (see rows II and 
III in Table 5), our estimates suggest that the effects are larger among the more able pupils. For 
expenditures, IV estimates are significant at the 5% level for both basic skills and high skills, but the 
estimate is larger for the latter. The effects of teacher hours are less precisely estimated and only 
significant at the 10% level. 
 Compared with all OLS estimates with municipality controls in Table 5, IV estimates are 
substantially higher. This suggests that compensating resource allocation is important in Norway and 
contributes to a significant downward bias in the standard cross-sectional estimates of school input 
effects. 
6. Robustness checks 
The main results are based on comparable municipalities with a similar set of characteristics. Even if 
we prefer this restriction, it is not crucial for our conclusions. The results based on all municipalities 
are reported in Table 6, and they turn out to be very similar. While point estimates are slightly lower, 
the effects are of the same order of magnitude, and they remain significant. 
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Table 6: School resources and pupil performance; All municipalities: OLS and IV estimates 
 (1) 
 
 
OLS 
No controls 
(2) 
 
Family 
background 
adjusted 
OLS 
 
(3) 
Family 
background 
adjusted + 
municipality 
characteristics. 
OLS 
(4) 
 
 
IV 
Panel A. Effect of increased expenditures (NOK 10,000) per pupil on 
I. Mean  .003 
(.013) 
.033 
(.011)*** 
.004 
(.016) 
.149 
(.047)*** 
II. Basic skills .003 
(.004) 
.010 
(.004)** 
–.002 
(.005) 
.032 
(.014)** 
III. High skills .004 
(.004) 
.008 
(.004)** 
.000 
(.005) 
.036 
(.015)** 
Panel B. Effect of more teacher hours (ln(hours per pupils)/10) on 
I. Mean  –.001 
(.005) 
.016 
(.005)*** 
.005 
(.007) 
.170 
(.077)** 
II. Basic skills .003 
(.002) 
.006 
(.001)*** 
.002 
(.002) 
.033 
(.017)* 
III. High skills .000 
(.002) 
.004 
(.002)** 
.001 
(.002) 
.063 
(.035)* 
Family 
characteristics No Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality 
controls  No No Yes Yes 
# Municipalities 429 429 429 429 
 Note: Dependent variables are average marks (row I), fraction with basic skills (row II) and highly skilled (row 
III) at the municipality level. Standard errors are in parentheses. */**/*** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%/5%/1% level respectively. Observations are weighted as described in section 2. 
 
 Our identification is based on cross-sectional variation across municipalities and even if 
we condition on a large number of family characteristics, and there are several potential issues related 
to how robust our results are. First, the pupils in the municipalities with hydro power incomes may be 
inherently different in terms of endowment before starting school conditional on the rich set of 
parental characteristics . Second, selective mobility in and out of hydro power municipalities may 
affect the results. And third, other amenities like better day care facilities etc and not better schools in 
HPTR municipalities, may contribute to explain the superior school performance at the age of 16. In 
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this section, we look empirically at the implications of these alternative explanations, and conclude 
that the results are hardly affected in any substantial way.  
Are pupils inherently different in hydro power municipalities? 
The first issue is whether pupils are inherently different in hydro and non-hydro municipalities. 
Unobserved ability differentials correlate positively with HPTR. Over generations, geographical 
mobility and intergenerational transmission of skills may sort high-ability families and children into 
communities with HPTR. In technical terms, if positive sorting on unobserved characteristics is 
important, the exclusion restriction is invalid and the resource effect estimates would be upward 
biased. If early test score information were available, a straight forward test would be to inspect the 
correlation between the conditional municipality level means (or fixed effects) with the level of HPTR. 
Such measures are not available, but a companion data set contains initial endowment proxies that 
enable us to check this kind of associations.13 In recent years, several studies have shown that an early 
child endowment measures such as birth weight, head size and apgar scores are fairly strong predictors 
for both early and later outcomes like educational attainment and earnings (Behrman and Rosenzweig, 
2004; Almon, Chay and Lee, 2005; Black, Devereux and Salvanes, 2007). Table 7 displays the last 
squares regression coefficient on HPTR where the conditional average endowment indicator for each 
municipality is regressed against HPTR and the same municipality controls as in the main (IV) 
analysis.  We find no association whatsoever for birth weight or head size, while the negative ‘effect’ 
of HPTR on the apgar-5 score suggests downward bias in our resource effect estimates rather than the 
opposite. In addition, the lack of systematic family characteristic differentials by level of HPTR, see 
Table 2, fits into this and provide evidence that supports our exclusion restriction.  
 
                                                     
13
 The Norwegian birth registry contains information on a set of initial health indicators for all children in Norway from 
1967-2006. See Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2007) for a detailed description of the data set.  
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Table 7:  Associations between HPTR (10 000 NOK) and pupil (municipality fixed) 
endowments in terms of Birth weight, Head size and Apgar score 
 All municipalities Expenditure sample Teacher hours sample 
Birth weight (ln kg)  -.0007 
(.0008) 
-.0012 
(.0011) 
-.0008 
(.0008) 
Head size (cm) -.0002 
(.0096) 
.0083 
(.0118) 
.0021 
(.0090) 
Apgar 5 score -.0114 
(.0106) 
-.0246 
(.0105) 
-.0170 
(.0085) 
Controls individual regression to estimate municipality fixed effects: Gender, age of mother, 
mother’s years of schooling, father’s years of schooling, family earnings, parents’ marital status 
number of siblings, number in the birth order, 
# Individual pupils 41961 20305 21078 
Municipality level controls: All variables included in the IV estimates, see Table 3A-B. 
# Municipalities 429 373 376 
Note: Apgar score is from the general test of a child health on a scale from 1-9 here measured 5 minutes after 
birth.  
Selective mobility 
The second set of robustness checks is related to parental mobility between municipalities. Mobility 
may affect our estimates through various mechanisms. The first channel relates to the period of 
exposure to a resource regime. Because pupils who have moved experienced resources different from 
that observed at graduation, mobility among pupils may bias resource estimates downward because of 
measurement error. Second, selective migration is potentially important. In our context, families with 
certain characteristics may be more inclined to stay in—or move into—communities with high HPTR 
and school resources.. 
 First, we track the residential municipality of pupils until graduation. About 83% of the 
pupils have lived in their graduation municipality throughout all 10 years of school (see Table 8). 
Because resources are fairly constant within municipalities over time, this high persistence suggests 
that the bias arising from measurement error is modest. We find a weak tendency for pupil seniority in 
the graduation municipality to be higher in municipalities with positive HPTR (see the last column of 
Table 8). There are also a slightly higher proportion of mothers in HPTR municipalities who lived in 
the same municipality in 1980, i.e., six years before the pupil was born. However, we do not expect 
that a minor difference of this magnitude will have any sizeable impact on our estimates. 
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Table 8: Graduation municipality seniority by HPTR percent 
 Comparable municipalities 
 
All 
municipalities Expenditures Teacher hours 
Municipalities 
with HPTR > 0 
Panel A. Pupil seniority in graduation municipality 
Less than 3 years 4.9 5.3 5.4 4.1 
4–6 years 4.7 5.0 5.0 3.9 
7–10 years 7.6 7.6 7.7 6.0 
11–15 years 17.2 16.7 16.8 15.6 
16 years (Born in municipality) 65.6 65.4 65.1 70.4 
B. Mother’s mobility 
Mother in graduation 
municipality in 1980 35.0 32.8 32.7 38.8 
 
Table 9:  Mobility and observed family background; Effects on the probabilities of graduation 
in high and medium level HPTR municipalities: PROBIT estimates 
 Probability of graduation in municipality with 
 High HPTR Medium HPTR 
 born in a municipality with born in a municipality with 
 HPTR = 0 HPTR > 0 HPTR = 0 HPTR > 0 
Panel A. All pupils 
Predicted mark –0.2247 
(0.0590)*** 
0.1092 
(0.0480)** 
–.1435 
(.0308)*** 
.0423 
(.0481) 
Constant –1.9779 
(0.1984)*** 
–1.2851 
(0.1647)*** 
–1.6594 
(.1057)*** 
.8812 
(.1640)*** 
Pseudo R2 0.008 0.001 .0031 .0002 
# pupils  43,092 4,613 43,092 4,613 
Panel B. Pupils who moved during 1989–2002 
Predicted mark –0.1701 
(0.0636)*** 
–0.2041 
(0.1370) 
–.0882 
(.0360)** 
–.1187 
(.0899) 
Constant –1.6135 
(0.2141)*** 
–0.9530 
(0.4553)** 
–1.1495 
(.1236)*** 
–.4134 
(.3039) 
Pseudo R2 0.005 0.006 .0012 .0019 
# pupils 9226 891 9226 891 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. */**/*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%/5%/1% level 
respectively. 
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 The effects of mobility are examined in Table 9. Even if our real concern is about sorting 
on unobserved characteristics, a study of how observable family characteristics are associated with 
geographical movements is clearly indicative. If pupils of advantaged families tend to move into 
municipalities with (large) HPTR, there is reason to be concerned that our estimates are driven by 
systematic sorting. The estimates in Table 9 show the effects of family background, summarized by 
predicted marks using our large set of family background controls, on the probability of graduation in 
a municipality with high (columns (1) and (2)) and medium HPTR (columns (3) and (4)). Conditional 
on residence at ages 1–2, the tables report the effects of predicted marks (based on the complete set of 
family characteristics) on graduation in high- or medium-level municipalities. Estimates for all pupils 
(Panel A) and the subsamples of those who actually moved (Panel B) are reported. Because our results 
are largely driven by the superior performance of pupils in municipalities with high HPTR, the main 
concern is mobility in and out of these communities. First, there is no indication that pupils born in 
regions without HPTR with favourable family characteristics are more likely to move to municipalities 
with high HPTR. On the contrary, higher predicted marks reduce this probability. There is, however, a 
tendency that pupils born in municipalities with positive HPTR are more likely to graduate in a 
municipality with high HPTR if they have a favourable family background. This largely reflects the 
low mobility of families in HPTR municipalities. Among pupils who actually move (see Panel B), 
there is no indication of a positive sorting on observables into high- or medium-HPTR communities. 
The estimated effects of predicted marks on graduation in high- or medium-HPTR municipalities are 
all negative. All in all, the relationships between family characteristics and mobility do not indicate 
that our resource effect estimates are upward biased. On the contrary, it there is any bias associated 
with family movements throughout the school years, they probably disguise some of the favourable 
effects of large school inputs. 
 As a further check on the impact of mobility we report estimates of the school resource 
effects, conditional on seniority in the municipality of graduation. Column (1) in Table 10A displays 
the effects of expenditures, based on non-immigrant pupils. They turn out to be almost identical to our 
main results in Tables 4 and 5. When we restrict the analyses to pupils born in their graduation 
municipality in column (2), the estimates are again very similar. For any given difference in the 
estimates, the effects of higher spending identified by the Wald or IV estimators are even larger. This 
is consistent with an explanation where mobility causes a bias because of differences in observed 
resources and what pupils have been exposed to throughout their school years. One might argue that 
families select themselves into municipalities according to parental preferences for children’s 
education before the pupil is actually born. Estimates in column (3) are based on children of mothers 
living in the graduation municipality six to seven years prior to the time of birth. The precision of the 
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estimates are lowered because of smaller samples and some of the effects are no longer significant. 
The IV estimate of expenditures on mean performance is somewhat lower (from .184 to .149), but still 
significant at the 10% level. 
 Table 10B displays the estimates from the same sampling exercise using teacher hours as 
the measure of school input. The pattern is similar for what is shown for total expenditures, but the 
precision is even lower presumably because our instrument is weaker for teacher hours than for total 
school expenditures. 
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Table 10A: Expenditures; Alternative sample definitions: Comparable municipalities 
 
Pupils born in 
Norway by 
Norwegian 
parents 
 
 
(1) 
Pupils born in 
graduation 
municipality 
 
 
 
(2) 
Pupils born in 
graduation 
municipality, and 
mother lived in 
municipality 
since 1980 
(3) 
Municipality of 
graduation replaced 
by municipality of 
birth 
 
 
(4) 
I. Mean     
Wald .074 
(.047) 
.098 
(.052)* 
.084 
(.064) 
.099 
(.067) 
OLS –.013 
(.021) 
.004 
(.038) 
.000 
(.030) 
-.000 
(.014) 
IV .184 
(.063)*** 
.206 
(.101)** 
.149 
(.081)* 
.156 
(.059)** 
II. Basic skills     
Wald .006 
(.021) 
–.011 
(.029) 
.045 
(.027) 
.036 
(.029) 
OLS –.011 
(.006) 
–.010 
(.007) 
–.012 
(.009) 
-.008 
(.005)* 
IV .040 
(.019)** 
.045 
(.021)** 
.044 
(.025)* 
.037 
(.017)** 
III. High skills     
Wald .043 
(.017)** 
.040 
(.020)** 
.037 
(.021)* 
.011 
(.024) 
OLS –.004 
(.007) 
.000 
(.008) 
.004 
(.009) 
-.001 
(.004) 
IV .057 
(.021)*** 
.055 
(.023)** 
.040 
(.025) 
.047 
(.020)** 
# pupils 25486 17444 8450 25542 
Note: Dependent variables are average marks (Panel A, I), Fraction with basic skills (Panel A, II) and high skills 
(Panel A, III) at the municipality level. Standard errors are in parentheses. */**/*** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%/5%/1% level respectively. Observations are weighted as described in section 2. 
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Table 10B: Teacher hours; Alternative sample definitions: Comparable municipalities 
 
Pupils born in 
Norway of 
Norwegian parents 
 
 
 
 
(1) 
Pupils born in 
graduation 
municipality 
 
 
 
 
(2) 
Pupils born in 
graduation 
municipality, 
and mother 
lived in 
municipality 
since 1980 
(3) 
Municipality of 
graduation 
replaced by 
municipality of 
birth 
 
 
(4) 
I. Mean     
Wald .045 
(.024)* 
.055 
(.027)** 
.035 
(.032) 
.071 
(.027)** 
OLS .001 
(.009) 
.007 
(.018) 
.011 
(.014) 
.003 
(.006) 
IV .250 
(.122)** 
.285 
(.165)* 
.166 
(.105) 
.206 
(.110)* 
II. Basic skills     
Wald .014 
(.009) 
.016 
(.012) 
.018 
(.013) 
.022 
(.018) 
OLS –.001 
(.003) 
–.001 
(.003) 
–.000 
(.004) 
-.003 
(.002) 
IV .050 
(.028)* 
.057 
(.033)* 
.040 
(.027) 
.048 
(.027)* 
III. High skills     
Wald .021 
(.009)** 
.014 
(.010) 
.007 
(.008) 
.013 
(.011) 
OLS .001 
(.003) 
.003 
(.004) 
.005 
(.004) 
.001 
(.002) 
IV .080 
(.039)** 
.069 
(.037)* 
.040 
(.028) 
.059 
(.034)* 
# pupils 26442 18048 8736 25214 
Note: Dependent variables are average marks (Panel A, I), Fraction with basic skills (Panel A, II) and high skills 
(Panel A, III) at the municipality level. Standard errors are in parentheses. */**/*** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%/5%/1% level respectively. Observations are weighted as described in section 2. 
 
One could argue that even the sub-sample of stayers is selective, as the out-migration from HPTR 
communities can be (negatively) correlated with pre-school ability of the kids.  In the final columns of 
Table 10A,B we ignore the change in resources which is due to post-birth family mobility by 
allocating each pupil to his/her municipality of birth rather than to the municipality of graduation. The 
two coincide for about two thirds of the sample, see Table 8. We would expect a lower effect of school 
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resources simply because measurement error is introduced for a substantial fraction of the pupils. If 
selective movers really explained our results, the estimated resource effects should go to zero. This is 
not confirmed. Columns (4) in Table 10A,B show that resource effects are slightly lower as we would 
expect from measurement error, but the IV estimates remain statistically significant.  
Other amenities in hydro power municipalities 
Finally, one might wonder whether other amenities in the HTPR communities actually can explain the 
superior school performance at age 16. They are rich municipalities with a wide range of high quality 
services like libraries, sport fields and public day cares. Empirical studies suggest that early education 
and high quality child care services have favourable long-term effects on development and educational 
attainment, but the evidence is mixed and hard to establish due to obvious selection issues (Currie, 
2001).14 Using an additional data set on the coverage of day cares by municipality, year and children’s 
preschool age, we find that the coverage of day care for children aged 1-6 was about 50 per cent on 
average for the years relevant for our sample (1988-1993), with a substantially higher coverage in 
municipalities with HPTR.15 Controlling for municipality characteristics (used to explain school 
resources in ‘stage 1’), we find that an increase in HPTR with 1,000 NOK is associated with a 1.2 
percent higher day care services coverage. A back of the envelope calculation suggests than a HPTR 
increase of 10,000 NOK would imply that one extra in nine pupils would have spent their pre-school 
years in a nursery. If the superior performance of pupils exposed to the increase in school resources 
triggered by 10,000 NOK more in HPTR actually was (totally) explained by this, nursery attendance 
(rather than spending time home with their mother, typically) would have to raise the expected mark at 
age 16 by 1.5(!), which is about two standard deviations. Cleary, the difference in child care coverage 
may explain just a minor fraction of the superior school performance at age 16 for pupils in HPTR 
communities. As a final check, we included child care service coverage as a municipality control in 
both stages of our IV estimation. Naturally, the power of the HPTR instrument drops a little, but the 
point estimates of the resource effects are basically unchanged while standard errors of the estimates 
increase a little.  
7. Conclusions 
Unobserved pupil heterogeneity and incomplete measures of school inputs make empirical 
identification of school resource effects a challenge. Our approach is founded on a set of institutional 
                                                     
14
 We are not aware of any reliable evidence for Norway.  
15
 This is a data set collected by Statistics Norway for the number of children in day cares, and coverage is calculated by 
using the population registry for Norway; see Løken and Salvanes (2007). 
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features in the educational sector in Norway that generate exogenous variation in school resources, 
caused by differences in municipality level revenues orthogonal to pupil ability. Hydropower plants 
provide a tax base, as nature (closeness to the waterfalls) and technology introduced about 100 years 
ago determine their location and the access to an immobile tax source for a group of municipalities. In 
principle, we compare pupil performance in neighbouring municipalities that differ only in terms of 
power plant presence. In addition, we are able to control for a rich set of observable family 
background variables and factors that affect school expenditures. We examine the effect of school 
resources on student performance at the age of 16 using comprehensive resource measures—teacher 
hours per pupil and total expenditures in schools—to avoid input substitution effects. We find that 
more resources in terms of higher expenditures do have a significantly positive effect on pupil 
achievement. The IV regression indicates that NOK 10,000 (US$1,175) higher expenditures per pupil 
are estimated to raise the exam mark by 0.181. Thus, every sixth pupil will have his/her exam mark 
raised by one level if the municipality spends NOK 10,000 more on each of them in school. An extra 
10% in teacher hours per pupil is estimated to raise the average mark with about 0.251, e.g., one level 
exam mark rise for one in every four pupils. As for most causal effects identified by “natural 
experiments”, the precision of these estimates is not impressive. Standard errors are from one-third to 
one-half of the estimated coefficients, implying that the lower bounds of the confidence intervals are 
close to zero. 
 With respect to the magnitude of the estimated effects, it is illustrative to relate them to 
the grade point average (of 11 subjects) for pupils from lower secondary school. The national mean is 
3.9 with a standard deviation of 0.8. Assuming that the resource effect is constant across subjects, our 
estimated expenditure effect amounts to 0.2 standard deviations, and the effect of teacher hours 
amounts to 0.3 standard deviations. 
 The IV estimates contrast with the standard cross-sectional estimates that indicate zero, or 
even negative, effects of school resources. This pattern is consistent with endogenous resource 
allocation where extra inputs are provided to children with specific needs. 
 Because families move and cross municipality borders, one might worry that endogenous 
location (Tiebout sorting) drives our estimates. Our results may also be biased if pupils in hydro power 
municipalities are inherently different in terms of initial endowments, and if other amenities in hydro 
power municipalities contribute to their superior school performance.  To wrap up all the robustness 
checks, we find no indication of superior initial endowments among kids born in HPTR, and it seems 
implausible that sorting through mobility on unobserved ability is driving our estimates. The strongest 
evidence is given by the estimates for pupils born in the municipality of graduation as well as using 
municipality of birth as the principle of linking performance and resources, which in both cases are 
41 
almost identical to what we find in our main analysis. Finally, day care services as an example of 
correlated amenities are unlikely to explain performance differentials more than ten years later.  
 While the average achievement of Norwegian students is close to the mean in 
international studies such as the PISA, a decomposition of the 2003 mathematics-performance 
examination shows that between-school variation is low in Norway compared with what is found in 
other countries (see Kjærnsli et al., 2004). Tiny performance differentials across schools suggest that 
the variation in school-specific factors is unimportant. However, it may also reflect the fact that 
resources do matter and that they are distributed across schools partly to level out performance 
differentials arising from other sources such as pupil composition. The findings in this paper support 
that the allocation of resources contributes to low performance differentials between schools. Finally, 
our estimates are likely to represent lower bounds of the effect of school resources. Norway is among 
the top countries in terms of school expenditures per pupil and our estimates are even identified by the 
high spending municipality. If there is decreasing returns to school resources, we would expect the 
effect of school resources to be at the low end in Norway when comparing across countries.  
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